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Abstract
Gift Basket diplomacy is an interest-based approach to negotiation that encourages voluntary
commitments as incentives for cooperation. International diplomats used this approach during the Nuclear
Security Summits (NSS), and it is the new standard for international cooperation. This model was
successfully replicated in climate talks and led to a global effort to combat climate change. The use of
house presents, and gift baskets encourages leadership and team building, to excel beyond intractable
consensus-based stalemates. The Gift Basket Diplomacy model may reduce South Asia’s nuclear risk and
enhance crisis management by increasing diplomatic efforts during regional party talks and cooperative
engagements, by keeping negotiators on a focused path to substantive counterterrorism and border
security cooperation.
Keywords: South Asia, diplomacy, multi-party talks, Nuclear Security Summits, Centers of Excellence,
Pakistan, India, technical cooperation, nonproliferation

I.

Background

Nuclear security cooperation advances through multi-party negotiations, among disparate states, with far
reaching implications for security and growth. The process is affected by a variety of factors including the
existence of a state’s weapons program, treaties, regional security, subnational politics, military-civilian
relations, and the uncertainty of other parties’ motives. Together, these and other elements added a
daunting complexity to the negotiation process that led to the first Nuclear Security Summit in
Washington, DC in 2010. Before the high-level assembly, binding agreements were obstacles that
prevented multilateral cooperation and communication. A central question for the NSS was the future of
United Nations (U.N.) Security Council Resolution 1540 (UNSCR 1540), a binding requirement for states
to secure nuclear material as a sovereign responsibility. The resolution established principles for
international cooperation to deter non-state actors from developing, acquiring, manufacturing, possessing,
transporting, transferring, or using nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery
doi:10.7290/ijns07s2wc
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with subsequent extensions intended to advance implementation through collective action and
negotiations [1]. While it set up legally binding obligations, its implementation was challenged because
many states did not meet their targets. Since its adoption in 2004, the resolution’s implementation was
limited by two to three-year incremental extensions.
Leading up to the first summit, negotiators recognized that earlier negotiation tactics had run their course
with minimal desired outcomes. In response to the need for collaborative negotiation dynamics, diplomats
encouraged interest-based bargaining to find common goals that allowed states flexibility in pursuing
solutions that best accommodated their unique interests and priorities. This negotiation approach also
encouraged team-building based on national priorities and common goals. Subsequently, the international
community agreed to this dramatic evolution in thinking, communicating, and working so to prioritize the
potential of reaching nationally determined goals and breaking stalemates.
Negotiation strategies were critical to the success of the NSS talks, which fostered interest-based
bargaining through coalitions. These strategies established a sense of shared urgency, flexibility, and
confidence building which led to negotiations closing with a landmark 10-year extension to UNSCR
1540, among other unprecedented international cooperation regimes in nuclear security.
The NSS talks also built a foundation for the Convention to Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials
(CPPNM). After eleven years, the CPPNM finally gained the number of ratifications required for its
amendment, which provided a framework for rules and regulations that govern physical protection against
nuclear threats and serves as a critical tool for accountability in nuclear security [2].

II.

Interest-Based Negotiations

If parties continued to work within a narrow interest perspective during multiparty talks, the dominant
strategy would be to ‘free ride’ the international system while others bear the cost of strengthening the
regime. This deficiency of trust and dominate-focused strategy led to suboptimal long-term outcomes at the
expense of collective rationality; consensus-based rules allowed spoilers to derail talks. To correct the
legacy of earlier negotiations, NSS re-structured the summit to encourage interest-based bargaining within
a principled negotiation framework.
States were called on to develop voluntary commitments before the negotiations, based on individual
institutional abilities called “house presents” and “gift baskets.” Gift basket diplomacy is a process that
circumvents the need for group consensus by bringing like-minded parties together to form smaller
groups, which work to develop a concise and similar language in documents and create agreements to
fulfill specific positions and goals. The resulting commitment served as a baseline at the onset of the
negotiation process. Blocs are encouraged to develop voluntary commitments and regional initiatives to
build coalitions around central issues. It allowed states flexibility to pursue solutions that best
accommodated their unique interests and priorities. The result was a push-pull dynamic in NSS talks
wherein model states strived to deepen collective commitment by working together around key areas of
agreement, while consensus-based deliberation encouraged baseline cooperation around areas of
disagreement.
Advanced signaling and communication is critical to building confidence and success. During NSS,
designated officials, known as Sherpas, worked between summits to create incremental momentum to
encourage innovation and team building. As change by one party impacts decisions for others, and
outcomes become more indeterminate, implementing advance commitment requirements enhances
communication and information sharing as a critical element of collaborative negotiation. To break
historical stalemate, it is necessary to enhance communication that provides information about other
parties’ goals and balances conflictual and cooperative motives.
doi:10.7290/ijns07s2wc
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Through NSS, a total of 30 states, with competing mandates, risk exposure, and access to resources,
worked toward agreements on nuclear security. They overcame political and economic power imbalances
which threatened to entrench party positions at the expense of identifying shared interests. Team
collaboration fostered the discovery of collective interests to countervail domestic pressure by bolstering
the moral force of like-minded states. The NSS created momentum for statements to be made on bilateral
nuclear security between key countries. Notably, China and the United States committed to increasing
cooperation on nuclear terrorism prevention and established an annual dialogue on nuclear security [2].
The NSS also spurred other national contributions. Argentina committed to eliminate its highly enriched
uranium (HEU), which established Latin America and the Caribbean as the first HEU-free region, and
Morocco committed to establishing the “Moroccan Agency for Safety and Security in Nuclear and
Radiological Fields” [3].
Critics who oppose gift basket diplomacy argue that the method promotes an uneven approach to nuclear
security; countries who participate will advance their nuclear security while the remaining countries will
fall further behind – for a field like nuclear security, this can be dangerous. However, this perspective
misses the point: for the method to work, the negotiations’ overall goal must include strengthening the
global nuclear security framework through a deepened collective commitment [4].

III. South Asia
One key gift basket, centered on the Joint Statement on Nuclear Security Training Centers, signals states’
intent to form the International Network for Nuclear Security Training and Support Centers (NSSCs) [3].
NSSCs was designed to train nuclear security personnel, provide technical support, and collaborate in
detection and response to nuclear security events, as well as build a strong nuclear security culture and
promote coordination among those involved in nuclear security efforts. The outlook for South Asian
nuclear security improved when India and Pakistan’s participation led to the development of highly
regarded Centers of Excellence (COEs) in partnership with the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA). Initially, efforts to harmonize COEs, spurred by faculty exchange, co-curriculum development,
and complementary programming in physical protection and response in the event of nuclear events, may
serve to increase technical cooperation. The COEs also presented an opportunity to build on other joint
commitments and contributed to efforts for securing nuclear material, the transport of nuclear and
radiological material, and strengthening international instruments of nuclear security. The role of COEs is
broad, ranging from building the technical capacity for measuring nuclear materials and sharing best
practices, to ensure the adequate protection of nuclear materials [5].
Gift basket diplomacy can expand and strengthen regional nuclear stability through counterterrorism and
border security. The membership of South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are diverse forums of states’ interests suited to regional
multiparty talks and currently engaged in security cooperation. SAARC must be understood in the context
that two of the four non-Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty nations are members in SAARC—India and
Pakistan [6]. Future regional crisis management may be bolstered by improving transparency through the
development of common equipment and operating procedures and could include the exchange of
information about nuclear facilities, imagery information, remote monitoring, and sensing, as well as site
inspections. Conducting simulation exercises can help identify critical gaps and address weak links.
Greater technical cooperation today lowers the miscalculations of states during crisis flashpoints in the
future.
Using gift basket diplomacy and nationally-determined commitments within a coalition framework in
South Asia could drive the development of national plans to secure nuclear material and strengthen
international instruments for nuclear security while establishing flexible, resilient policies based on the
doi:10.7290/ijns07s2wc
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institutional capacities of each state. One way to understand the NSS negotiations is to see them as an
overarching umbrella and the first in a series of escalating commitments that create a shadow for the
future. This perspective of the progressive nature and underlying need for reciprocity may work to
counterbalance underlying disagreements between parties.
Both Pakistan and India participated in the four nuclear security summits and subsequently established
concrete achievements. The NSS was instrumental in building the nuclear security abilities and
establishing individual COEs in both countries. India also supported the “Joint Statement on
Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation” along with 37 other countries in 2016 [8].
Future negotiation tactics requiring parties to state redlines and find practical solutions may foster fresh
dynamics in the intractability of South Asia. To prevent talks from collapsing, mediators should
encourage parties to know their counterparts on a personal level, others’ interests, and underlying needs.
This process de-neuters zero sum approaches to negotiations by challenging the definition of success and
allows an optimal non-zero-sum approach to emerge.
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) play a critical role in ensuring policy pressure and public
visibility during talks. To end South Asia’s historical stalemate, think tanks and universities serve to lay
the groundwork for dialogue, while key NGOs are positioned to lead concerted policies designed to
rebalance interest-based coalitions and consensus-based decisions, forcing a shift toward immediate,
contextualized, and tangible solutions. NGOs can put pressure on governments and drive sustained
international negotiations and strengthen multilateral institutions to enhance national level measures.
They are in a unique position to build meaningful relationships with both governmental and nongovernmental parties and engage with new stakeholders who have not yet been included in the nuclear
security dialogue [7].

IV. Conclusion
The NSS contributed to the 10-year extension of UNSCR 1540 in 2011 and brought states into agreement
based on historic, current, and future responsibilities. The NSS talks also led to the ratification of the
2005 Amendment to the CPPNM [citation] to establish a framework for rules and regulations governing
physical protection against nuclear threats and serve as a critical tool for accountability in nuclear
security. The negotiation process promoted cooperation where consensus was difficult because of
divergent interests, enabled by the emergence of blocs with common interests. Ideas influence policy by
supplying road maps to shared goals. In the case of nuclear security, the ideas of shared and sovereign
responsibility affect strategic solutions where equilibrium was lacking. The beliefs led to cooperation in
global situations where consensus was difficult to sustain. These ideas are now embedded in the political
institutions of the United Nations to ensure flexible solutions will continue to be the key for breaking the
stalemate in international negotiations. In a new era of global cooperation, on one of the most complex
issues facing humanity, the gift basket diplomacy approach should be replicated in regional talks in South
Asia and beyond.
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